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PARTIES 
J uan i ta J FusseJ ] , Petiti oner 
Department of Commerce Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a response to Petitioners appea. i rom i :ir Order of 
David E. Robinson, Director of the oivisit - :* d 
Profession: Licensing, Department of Commerce, State of Utah, 
dated May 99 0- The Petitioner seeks a reversal *i the Order 
and a remand with directions ; -, -' - * : .* *-.-. a 
her licensure as a doctoral level psychologist. 
The Petitioner i n thi s matter, Juanita Fussell (Fussell), 
initially applied for' I. Icoiisuin at the doctors J. level as a 
psychologist on August 5, ! 987, Petitioner's application was 
denied by the Psychologist Licensing Board on the basis that she 
did not meei t .1 u=» reqi i I remei its of Utah Code A i n iota ted § 5 8-25-
2(1)(b), wb requires that: 
1• Each applicant for a license to practice as a 
psychologist shall: 
(b) produce transcripts of credit which are acceptable to 
the representative committee which demonstrate that the 
candidate for licensing has received a doctoral degree based 
on a program of studies whose content was primarily 
psychological from an accredited educational institution, 
recognized by the Division. 
1 
The Board's conclusion that Fussell did not qualify for 
licensure in the State of Utah was upheld by the Special Appeals 
Board. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The duties and functions of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing are outlined in Utah Code Annotated § 58-
1-1 et seq. Section 58-1-6(1) (7) states that it is the function 
and responsibility of the Division to prescribe, adopt and 
enforce rules to administer Title 58 and also makes it the 
responsibility of the Division to issue, refuse to issue, revoke, 
suspend, renew, refuse to renew or otherwise act upon a license 
or licensee. Section 58-1-8 makes it the duty, function and 
responsibility of the Board to recommend to the Director 
appropriate rules and to screen applicants and recommend 
licensing renewal, reinstatement and re-licensure actions. 
Finally, § 58-1-9 states that a duty, function and responsibility 
of the Division, in collaboration with the Board, is to prescribe 
license qualifications and to prescribe rules governing 
applications for licenses. These three statutes, therefore, 
allow the Division, in collaboration with the Board, to set a 
standard for licensing qualification for all applicants applying 
for professional licensure. They also designate the Division, in 
2 
collaboration with the Board, to prescribe any rules governing 
applications for licenses. 
In unrefuted testimony, Dr. Thomas Schenkenberg described 
the complicated process for the promulgation of Rules. According 
to Dr. Schenkenberg the process includes drafts by the Utah 
Psychological Association and reviews by the Psychology Board. 
Reviews are made available to every psychologist in the State. 
The Board reviews national trends in licensing laws and reviews 
are conducted of the Psychological Association Model Licensing 
Act for compatibility and consistency with other states. 
(Transcript p. 147-148). Dr. Schenkenberg further testified that 
the Utah statute does not provide discretionary language allowing 
the Board to make a decision that is not based on the statute. 
(Transcript 163-168). It is an unrefuted that the regulatory 
language in the Utah Statute was drawn form a national source and 
that thirty three (33) jurisdictions use the same or more 
restrictive language. (Transcript p. 173.) 
Candidates for licensure as psychologists in the State of 
Utah are called upon to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-25-2 Section (l)(b) of this statute requires that 
candidates; 
produce transcripts of credit which are acceptable to 
the representative committee which demonstrate that the 
candidate for licensing has received a doctoral degree 
based on a program of studies whose content was 
3 
primarily psychological, from an accredited educational 
institution recognized by the Division. 
(Empha sis added.) 
The above stated section was analyzed by the Supreme Court of 
Utah in 1981, in the* case of Athay v. State Dep't of Business 
Regulation, 626 P.2d 965, (Utah 1981). In Athay, the trial court 
looked at the statute and rules and found that: 
No rules, regulations, guidelines, or description of 
any kind relating to the type of courses which would be 
considered by the Committee to be "primarily 
psychological" within the meaning of the statute had, 
at that time, ever been adopted, published or 
communicated by the Committee. . . . 
Id. at 966 (Emphasis provided by the Court). 
Because of this the Court felt that there were no objective, 
identifiable standards against which the applicant's 
qualifications could be judged. The trial court felt that the 
statute was vague and ambiguous in nature. This deprived the 
plaintiff of an opportunity to qualify and offended basic notions 
of due process. Id. 
The Supreme Court in Athay affirmed the trial court's 
finding and held that: 
The legislative* grant of authority to the 
administrative agency is necessarily in general 
language. It is the responsibility of the 
administrative body to formulate, publish and make 
available to concerned persons rules which are 
sufficiently definite and clear that persons of 
ordinary intelligence will be understand and abide by 
them. 
4 
Id. at 968 (Emphasis added.) 
The Court further stated that the failure to establish guidelines 
for a curriculum or a criteria for course content, which is 
"primarily psychological" constituted arbitrary action. 
Partially in response to the filing of the Atheiy case and in 
holding with § 58-1-1 et seq., the Division, in collaboration 
with the Psychology Board promulgated rules defining the 
requirements for applicants. One of these rules is the rule at 
issue in this case, R153-25-8(4)(b). The Rules are outlined in 
R153-25-1 et seq. Section 8(4)(b) which defines "a program of 
studies whose content is primarily psychological" as follows: 
(b) The program wherever it may be administratively 
housed, must be clearly identified and labelled as a 
psychology program. Such a program must specify in 
pertinent institutional catalogs and brochures its 
intent to educate and train professional psychologists. 
The Petitioner in this matter, has not met the requirements 
described in R153-25-8(4)b. (See Order, Appendix A.) Fussell, 
received a Doctor of Education (Ed.D) degree through the Human 
Development Counseling program of the George Peabody College for 
teachers at Vanderbilt University (Peabody). The 1976-77 course 
catalog for this college reflects that Doctorate Degrees of 
Education were available in three programs within the college: 
Human Development Counseling, Psychology and Special Education. 
Fussell chose Human Development Counseling, a program whichf 
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according to the Licensing Board and the Special Appeals Board, 
does not qualify her for licensure in the State of Utah. One of 
the reasons for this decision is that the Human Development 
Counseling Program is described in the Peabody College catalog as 
follows: 
The primary goal of the Human Development 
Counseling Program is to train individuals at the M.S., 
Ed.S, and Ed.D levels to intervene via the helping 
relationship as a means of enabling persons to become 
more fully functioning... The Peabody program 
recognizes the professionally trained counselor as a 
human development teacher whose primary function is to 
help individuals enhance life adjustment and facilitate 
behavioral development, such that they can cope more 
effectively with their environment. . . . 
Settings in which graduates apply their counseling 
skills will vary. They will include school counseling 
and guidance, classroom teaching, correctional 
institutions, vocational rehabilitation centers, mental 
health centers, drug treatment centers, marriage and 
family counseling clinics and community action 
agencies. 
(Empha sis added.) 
The course catalog further provides as follows: 
The curriculum of the program in human development 
counseling conforms to the Standards for the 
Preparation of Counselors and Other Personal Service 
Specialists developed by the Association of Counselor 
Educators and Supervisors (ACES), and is intended to 
reflect the trend in professional training programs for 
its competency/performance-based instruction. 
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The Psychology Program offered in the 1976-77 course catalog 
for the George Peabody College for Teachers at Vanderbilt 
University describes its course offerings as follows: 
Programs in psychology reflect concern about the 
development of human resources and the discovery of new 
ways to bring psychological knowledge and research 
skills to bear upon societal problems, especially those 
which are amenable to intervention during the early 
years of life. A heavy emphasis is placed on doctoral 
level training in various specialty areas including 
developmental psychology, educational psychology, 
experimental psychology, mental retardation research, 
social and personality psychology, and transactional-
ecological psychology (which includes sub specialties 
of clinical, community, counseling and social 
psychology), which are accredited by the American 
Psychological Association. . . . 
General requirements of all psychology students 
are kept to a minimal level to encourage and their 
advisors to develop carefully thought-out programs 
designed to meet the specific needs of the individual 
students, A training committee faculty and student 
exist for each area of specialization which sets 
specific guidelines and requirements for the 
specialization. 
The above stated description of the Psychology Program clearly 
fits within the requirements set out by R153-25-8 (4)(b). 
Fussell, however, took course in Human Development rather than 
the Psychology Program. Fussell received her degree in 1985. 
The program catalog of the Peabody in 1985 makes it even clearer 
that the Human Development Program is not a Psychology Program. 
According to the catalog: 
Credentialing as a nationally certified counselor 
is possible through the department. In addition, 
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certification as a school counselor may be obtained 
through appropriate course work. Students wishing to 
be licensed in marriage and family counseling or other 
related areas, may arrange through additional course 
work and supervision to apply for licensure, depending 
on state regulations. Individuals interested in 
clinical psychology training or licensure as a 
psychologist, however, should apply to programs 
approved by the American Psychological Association. 
(Empha sis added.) 
The 1985 catalog in describing the Human Development Program 
provides: 
At the post-baccalaureate level the Department of 
Human Development Counseling (HDC) has as its primary 
goal the education of mental health generalists who 
will function in a host of mental settings as 
counselors. The program maintains a balance between 
didactic and experiential learning. The HDC program is 
interdisciplinary in nature with faculty and resources 
from such areas as psychology, sociology, management, 
education, human development and community 
organization. 
Although Fussell has testified that it was always her intent to 
become a licensed psychologist, she did not enroll in a program 
that was intended to train psychologists. (Transcript p. 16, 19, 
85. ) 
In applying for a license to practice as a psychologist in 
the state of Utah, the applicant submits an application packet 
which the Board reviews at their monthly meeting. Two Board 
members look at every file and if a question arises the whole 
group discusses it. In the instance of Fussell, her initial 
materials were reviewed and several matters were clarified with 
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her by mail. After these matters were cleared up, Fussell's 
materials were reviewed and it was found that her program did not 
meet the requirements of the Utah statue. (Transcript p. 165-
167) . 
The Board, when considering applications for licensure 
relies heavily on the statute and the rules and regulations as 
guidelines by which to make their decisions. According to Dr. 
Schenkenberg, the Board's duty to the State and to the Governor 
who appoints the Board is to apply the statutes, rules and 
regulations as they're written and not to go beyond the authority 
that's established within those guidelines. (Transcript p. 149.) 
The Board may spend two or three hours reviewing an individual 
applicant's file and discussing whether it meets the criteria 
established by the rules and regulations. Dr. Schenkenberg 
testified that he was involved with the decision making process 
on the application of Dr. Fussell. He stated that there was a 
series of votes and that the final conclusion of the Board was 
that Fussell's program of study simply did not meet the statute 
nor the rules and regulations. According to Dr. Schenkenberg, 
the Board felt that Fussell's program clearly did not meet the 
requirements of § 4(b) of Rule 153-25-8. (Transcript p. 152.) 
Dr. Schenkenberg further testified that "Human Development 
Counseling is clearly not labelled as a psychology program." 
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There were six, and perhaps seven programs at Vanderbilt, at 
George Peabody, at the time when all this educational experience 
took place, which would have qualified.1 
There is further unrefuted testimony that the movement of 
the Board is toward raising the criteria set out in the rules. 
(Transcript p. 160.) Also, according to the testimonies of Dr. 
Furhman and Dr. Schenkenberg, an exception has never been carved 
out for any individual since the rules were established. 
According to the doctors, there have been other incidents in 
which an individual received his or her degree in a different 
department, while a lot of their course work was psycholcgical in 
nature. As in the case at hand, these application have been 
refused licensure. (Transcript pp. 120-121, 159.) 
The psychologists testifying on behalf of the State also 
stated in unrefuted testimony that the program of studies taken 
by Ms. Fussell was not in a department whose intent was to 
1
 "It is not simply a matter of laying off the Clinical 
Psychology program against Human Development Counseling; there were 
five or six other programs that would clearly qualify. [The rule] 
states that 'A program must specify in pertinent institutional 
catalogs and brochures its intent to educate and train professional 
psychologist.' This clearly is not present in any of the [Human 
Development counseling] catalogs or brochures . . . . The 
materials that Dr. Fussell presented to us indicate that the intent 
of the program was to develop teachers. The program description 
for 1985 states that; if the goal is to become a licensed 
psychologist, go to one of the programs here at Vanderbilt that 
have and APA accreditation-" (Transcript p. 152-153-) 
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prepare professional psychologists. This was a matter of concern 
to the Board because its members felt that It would affect her 
ability to practice psychology as an independent, licensed 
professional. According to - ^r ; it is impoutatit that a 
student take an integrated program of studies that allows the 
person to have both the experience and theory that are necessary 
in order to practice psychology (Transcript p. 82, 85.) Dr. 
Furhman testified that although Fussell has had many courses and 
perhaps even many required courses, she has not matriculated and 
has not been accepted i nto a pa rogram that was i ntei ided to train 
professional psychologists. This means that Fussell did not have 
a directed and articulated integrated program of studies leading 
to preparation as a professional psychologist.2 (Transcript p. 
85. ) 
2
 Although, the Petitioner claimed at the hearing her courses 
were APA approved, it is undisputed that the APA does not accredit 
courses. Rather, according to Dr. Furhman's testimony, the APA 
accredits programs. Dr. Furhman is a site visitor for the APA. 
This position allows her to visit pre-doctoral training programs 
and internship programs and either approve them for accreditation 
or for establish accreditation. She assists in the review process 
and submits recommendations to the national committee. Dr. Furhman 
testified that the purpose of APA accreditation programs is to try 
and insure continuing competency and a quality of educational 
course work. Additionally, it assures that the program includes 
both theory and provides a person with the kind of experiences that 
allow them to practice independently as a psychologist as well as 
insuring a high quality of training, both as a teacher and as a 
researcher in psychological matters. 
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Dr. Malouf testified that Fussell's program was not 
administratively housed in a psychology program, that the 
brochures did not state the intent of training psychologists, and 
that her program did not appear to be a psychology program. Dr. 
Malouf had a concern that the program outlined by Fussell seemed 
extremely limited and was not intended to train a psychologist. 
(Transcript p. 127-129). Dr. Malouf further expressed concern 
that since research is a major component what a psychologist's 
work, a program that de-emphasizes research to that extent does 
not qualify to train psychologists. (See testimony of Fussell, 
Transcript p. 180, where Fussell testifies that she did not wish 
to do research.) Dr. Malouf testified that Fussell's Human 
Development program did not have the necessary focus or emphasis 
on psychology. Finally, he voiced a concern that there was no 
process by which someone could be disqualified or taken out of 
the program if they did not have a the proper skills or personal 
traits to become a psychologist.3 
3
 In a normal psychology program, the student mast meet 
certain qualifications and criteria to remain in the program. If 
that student is failing or lacking in qualifications he would be 
instructed to make up for it. If he could or did not, it would be 
recommended that he leave the program. The above stated criteria 
and disciplinary approach did not appear in Fussell's program, 
since she was training to be a Human Development Counselor rather 
than a Psychologist. (Transcript p. 130-132.) 
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The Petitioner's program description was not "primarily 
psychological" during t ho f.ntio ol her studies or at the time of 
her graduation. Fussell attended a university that offered 
accredited programs in courses of study that are clearly 
described as primarily psychological in nature. Despite this, 
she chose to take a course of studies that was designed to train 
human development counselors rather than psychologists* Fussell 
could have enrolled in the psychology program and also have taken 
courses with the practical approach she desired. Instead she 
chose to develop her own program. (Transcript p. 180-18 3). 
Finally, it must be noted that currently, Fussell is working on 
the doctoral level as a psychologist at Weber State College. Her 
current employment is precisely what her program description and 
her course of studies and training qualify Fussell to do. It 
should also be taken into consideration that Fussell has worked 
in Utah since 1983. The Rule at dispute in this case was 
promulgated prior to 1983. Therefore Fussell should have been 
aware that her course work was not acceptable several years 
before her graduation. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FUSSELL PROPOUNDED AN INCOMPLETE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Two Utah cases, Grace Drilling v. Board of Review,, 776 P, 2d 
63 (Utah App. 1989) and Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 
775 P. 2d 439 (Utah App. 1989) set out the proper standard of 
review in court of appeals review of agency decisions. The 
substantial evidence test propounded by the Grace Drilling court-
requires that the court review both sides of the record to 
determine if the Board's findings are supported by the 
substantial evidence. This requires that the paarty opposing the 
Board's decision has the burden of showing that the Board's 
decision is not supported by relevant evidence that a reasonable 
mind would find adequate to support a conclusion. The Pro-
Benefit court stated that it would not disturb the Boards 
application of factual findings to the law unless its 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality. The Court further states that the conclusions must 
be reasonable and rational as measured against the language and 
purpose of the governing legislation. Despite Petitioner's 
claims, the Board's decision is clearly based on Utah statute and 
is neither unreasonable or irrational. It was the Legislatures 
intent that the Board interpret the relevant statutes. The rule 
14 
in question interprets the relevant statue in a cl^ar, recisonable 
and rationd1 manner, 
POINT II 
FUSSELL IS NOT QUALIFIED TO PRACTICE AS AN 
INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONALLY LICENSED PSYCHOLOGIST 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
There is a difference between being qualified to practice 
psychology on the doctoral level and being qualiiied to practice 
independently as a licensed psychologist. Fussell is currently 
practicing psychology on the doctoral level at Weber State 
College Student Counseling Center. This is precisely what: her 
course in Human Development Counseling trained her to do. This 
course of studies, however, did not train Fussell to work as an 
independent licensed psychologist. Fussell's program and course 
of studies do not give her the expertise to become licensed in 
Utah. 
POINT III 
PRIOR TO RECEIVING HER DEGREE PETITIONER HAD REASON TO 
KNOW SHE DID NOT QUALIFY FOR LICENSURE IN UTAH 
Prior to receiving her degree, Petitioner had reason to know 
that she did not qualify for licensure in Utah. The rule at 
issue in this case was promulgated prior to 1983. Fussell came 
to Utah in 1983, two years before her graduation. Despite the 
fact that she has stated that her intention from the beginning 
was to be licensed as a psychologist and the fact that it is 
15 
clear from the relevant rule that her program did not qualify her 
to be a psychologist, she did not change her course of studies* 
Fussell's course of study does not qualify her for licensure in 
Utah. Any right Fussell may have to licensure is subordinate to 
Utah's right to regulate the licensure of psychologists. The 
fact that Fussell did not choose to take a program of studies 
that would be approved in the State of Utah, but instead chose to 
take her own independent course, does not create a special 
dispensation allowing her to ignore the statutorily created rules 
and regulations. 
POINT IV 
THE AGENCY'S ACTIONS ARE NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR CAPRICIOUS 
Fussell provides no basis upon which to rest her claim that 
the agency's action is arbitrary and capricious. The Board and 
the Division have promulgated rules which provide a clear and 
acceptable standard by which students or applicants may judge 
their qualifications for licensure. Fussell claims that because 
her course of studies does not meet these rules, the rules must 
be arbitrary and capricious. Fussell did not take a course of 
study designed to train her to become a psychologist. Fussell 
designed her own course of study, taking courses in which she was 
interested and apparently dismissing those in which she was not. 
However, according to Ms. Fussell's logic, any student who took 
16 
numerous psychology courses could claim that he was therefore 
qualified to become a ] i censed psychologist .'uch a standard 
would be arbitrary and capricious, were it to replace the clear 
and acceptable standards which currently exist in the rules. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FUSSELL PROPOUNDED AN INCOMPLETE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Fussell relies heavily on Grace Drilling In expounding the 
proper standard of review in this case. Pro-Benefit Staffing 
decided the same day, gives additional insight into the Court of 
Appeals posture toward review of agency decisions. Both cases 
state that the standard of review for mixed questions of law and 
fact is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4). Grace Drilling primarily explains 
what the "substantial evidence test" for UAPA is, while Pro-
Benefit focuses on the standard of review in a state boards 
application of law. 
The substantial evidence test, as propounded by the Grace 
Drilling court, requires that the court "review both sides of the 
record to determine whether the boards findings are supported by 
substantial evidence." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68, n.7. 
This means that the court must "consi clei: n o t oi i J y tl le evidence 
supporting the Board's factual findings, but also the evidence 
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that 'fairly detracts from the weight of the [Board's] evidence'" 
Id. at 68. 
However, the 
party challenging the board's findings of fact must marshal 
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that 
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence . . . . Substantial 
evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence . . . 
though 'something less than the weight of the evidence.' 
Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." 
Id. (Citations omitted.) 
Thus, the party opposing the Board's decision has the burden 
of showing that the Board's decision is not supported by 
"relevant evidence [that] a reasonable mind [would find] adequate 
to support a conclusion." Id. Fussell must show that a 
reasonable thinking person would not agree with the board's 
decision. Fussell has not met this burden in her petition to the 
Court of Appeals or her hearing before the Special Appeals Board. 
In attempting to prove her claim that the Board's decision 
is not supported by substantial evidence, Fussell points to the 
decision in Athay (Br. Petitioner p.24.) Fussell also claims 
that the State makes an arbitrary and undisclosed requirement, in 
asking that a program be listed in the "Designated Doctoral 
Programs in Psychology (DDPP)." There is no such requirement in 
Utah law. Rather the DDPP is just one indication of the intent 
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and viability of a program of studies Fusse] ] rial :os tl le claim 
that this is a requirement in order to distract the court from 
the more relevant issues. One of these issues is that the Rule 
in questioi i was promulgated in accordance wi tl 1 tl le Courts holding 
in Athay. 
At the time Athay applied for licensure as a psychologist in 
Utah, the only existing standard was set under Utah Code Ann. § 
58-25-2• The Division had not promulgated any rules or standards 
explaining what was meant by a program "primarily psycho]ogical 
in nature•" The lack of anything further in the statute, rules 
or regulations explaining that phrase was the basis for the 
courts decision. The Athay court stated that "no objective, 
identifiable standard existed against which the Plaintiff's 
qualifications could be judged." Athay 626 P.2d at 966. After 
Athay filed suit, but before her case was decided, 1he Division 
promulgated the "objective identifiable" standards which Fussell 
is now claiming are invalid or arbitrary and capricious when 
applied to her. 
In its explanation in Athay, the Utah Court of Appeals 
recognized that a State agency necessarily has the authority to 
promulgate rules and regulations explaining the agency's 
authorizing statutes. This authority was further recognized by 
the court in Pro-Benefit. The Pro-Benefit court stated that 
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relief would be granted if an "agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law," Pro-Benefit 775 P<2d at 442- The Court in 
Pro-Benefit recognized that the current Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)b is identical to its Model State Administrative Procedures 
Act (MSAPA) counterpart, §5-116 (c)(4) and then quoted f 3:01a the 
comment section of the MSAPA: 
Paragraph (c)(4) includes two distinct matters -
interpretation and application of the law . . . [WJith 
regard to the agency's application of the law to specific 
situations, the enabling statute normally confers some 
discretion upon the agency. Accordingly, a court should 
find reversible error in the agency's application of the law 
only if the agency has improperly exercised it-'s discretion. 
Id. at 442. 
In the case at hand there has been no showing by the Petitioner 
that the Division or the Board improperly exercised its 
discretion. 
The Pro-Benefit court goes on to say that it will 
continue to embrace the analysis described in Administrative 
Services for reviewing mixed questions of .law and fact 
periodically . . . accordingly, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4)(b) we will not disturb the boards application of 
its factual findings to the law unless its determination 
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
The Court in Pro-Benefit outlines the standard that must be 
applied in an administrative hearing. This standard requires 
that the party opposing the Board's decision must prove that the 
decision was unreasonable and irrational in order for the court 
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to disturb an agency's application of law There has been no 
such showmq m t ho case at hand. Tho Psychology Board's and the 
Special Appeal Board's decisions are firmly based upon the 
relevant statutes, rules and regulations. 
The Pro-Benefit < ourt additionally decided that the standard 
of view is to be "a intermediate standard" covering "the Board's 
conclusions, [which] must be reasonable and rational h measured 
against the language ind purpose of the governing legislation,'" 
Pro-Benefit at 442. The Pro-Benefit court explained that "[tjhis 
intermediate standard of review also governs our review cf 'the 
[Board's] interpretation of the operative provisions of the 
statutory law it is empowered to administer, especially those 
generalized terms that bespeak a legislative intent to delegate 
their interpretation to the responsible agency'." Id. at 442, 
n.2 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the case at hand, the applicable statutes clearly 
demonstrate that it is the Legislature's intent that the 
Division, in conjunction with the Licensing Board, interpret the 
applicable statutes. Thus the Psychology Board, in promulgating 
interpretive rules, has acted in accordance with the applicable 
statutes. lussell however, would have the court believe that it 
is beyond the Division and the Board's jurisdiction to make these 
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interpretive rules. Clearly this is contrary to the court's 
finding in the Pro-ESenefit case. 
In the Athay case the court felt that the statute was overly 
ambiguous. The rul€*s promulgated were intended to, and have 
clarified that ambiguity. Rule 4(b) is one subsection of a 
section which sets forth an "identifiable standard. . .against 
which. . • qualifications could be judged." Athay at 966. The 
Division and the Board have acted within the legislcitive intent 
in interpreting the statute through the rules. The Psychology 
Board and the Specicil Appeals Board have acted correctly in their 
application of the rules and in finding that Fussell is not 
qualified to become a psychologist in the State of Utah. 
POINT II 
FUSSELL IS NOT QUALIFIED TO PRACTICE 
AS AN INDEPENDENT, PROFESSIONAL, LICENSED PSYCHOLOGIST 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
Fussell points out, in her brief, that she is qualified to 
practice psychology on the doctoral level in the State of Utah. 
However, Fussell does not distinguish between practicing 
psychology on the doctoral level and being qualified to practice 
independently as a licensed psychologist. Currently, Fussell is 
practicing psychology on the doctoral level in the State. She is 
a staff psychologist, with the title of "Dr.," at the Weber State 
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College Student Counseling Center, in point of fact, Fusseli is 
doing exactly what the program she graduated from qualifies her 
to do. The Peabody college catalog description of Fusseli's 
program states as follows: 
The Peabody program recognizes the professionally 
trained counselor as a human development teacher whose 
primary function is to help individuals enhance life 
adjustment and facilitate behavioral development, such 
that they can cope more effectively with their 
environment..,. Settings in which graduates apply their 
counseling skills will vary. They will include school 
counseling and guidance, classroom teaching, 
correctional institutions, vocational and 
rehabilitation centers, mental health centers, drug 
treatment centers, marriage and family counseling 
clinics, and community action agencies, (emphasis 
added). 
The catalog goes on to state that this program "stands in 
contrast to the traditional approach to training." Fussell's 
program qualifies her to practice psychology at the doctorate 
level, however, the program does not meet the Utah statutory 
requirement for a license to practice psychology. Nor does this 
program demonstrate an intent to educate and train professional 
psychologists as required. Fussell's program was directed to 
teaching situations rather than those of a professional 
psychologist. 
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The above description clearly intimates that Fussell **s 
program stands in contrast to traditional psychological 
training.4 The Peabody course catalog also describes the Human 
Development Program as meeting "the Standards for the Preparation 
of Counselors and Other Personal Service Specialist developed by 
the Association of Counselor Educators and Supervisors (ACES)*" 
Although, Fussell has worked as a psychologist at a doctoral 
level, pursuant to U.C.A. § 58-25a~6, this does not qualify her 
for licensure as a psychologist although in the State of Utah. 
It simply qualifies her to continue in her current employment. 
If Fussell wished to practice as a psychologist she should have 
taken one of the numerous courses that train psychologists. 
POINT III 
PRIOR TO RECEIVING HER DEGREE PETITIONER HAD REASON TO KNOW 
SHE DID NOT QUALIFY FOR LICENSURE IN UTAH, 
In 1983, Fussell was a psychology intern at the University 
of Utah and has continued to work in Utah since that time. Rule 
153-25-8 which outlines and defines the statutory requirements, 
4
 The catalog description goes on to say that the traditional 
approach "generally focusses on maladjustment and abnormal 
behavior, an approach which is increasingly regarded as outmoded," 
Nowhere does this description state that this "new approach" has 
received recognition as being better than, or even the equivalent 
of, a traditional psychology program for the purposes of licensure 
as a psychologist 
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was promulgated prior to 1983. Because of this, Fussell had 
reason to know that her program did not qualify her for a 
psychologist license in the State of Utah. Despite this, Fussell 
continued in her chosen program of Human Development Counseling. 
She continued with this program until she received her Doctor of 
Education, in 1985. 
The Petitioner has stated that her intention from the 
beginning was to be licensed as a psychologist. (Transcript p. 
16, 19, 41). Because she was living and training in Utah, after 
Rule 153-25-8 was promulgated, she had reason to know, and should 
have known that she did not meet the standards set by the rule. 
Despite this, she continued in a program of studies and received 
a degree that was not intended to train students to become 
psychologists. In the Peabody catalog the description of the 
Psychology Program states that the Psychology Program places a 
heavy emphasis on " doctoral level training in various specialty 
areas...which are accredited by the American Psychological 
Association." From the descriptions of both the Human 
Development and the Psychology Programs in the course catalog, it 
is clear that Fussell had the opportunity to assess which 
professional associations recognize and accredited the training 
received from the programs. 
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Although Dr. Fussell claims to be and is licensed in the 
state of Tennessee, it is undisputed that the requirements for 
licensing in Tennessee are lower than the requirements in Utah. 
Tennessee accepts graduates from programs which are not termed 
psychology programs, as long as the degree is from a "closely 
allied field if it is the opinion of the board that the training 
required therefore is substantially similar." (Tennessee Code 
§63-11-208). The language in the Tennessee Statute allows the 
Tennessee Licensing Board discretion in deciding which doctoral 
degrees are acceptable for licensure in psychology. Fussell 
relied on the discretion of the Tennessee Board rather that her 
program, in applying as an independent practicing psychologist in 
that state. In Utah, however, the Board does not have 
discretionary judgement in accepting applications. Utah statutes 
do not allow the Board to go beyond the rules and regulations. 
(Transcript p. 163). 
"It is a commonly accepted fact that a states has the 
authority to promulgate its own licensing requirements." Brown 
v. Bd. of Exam, of Psychologists, 378 S E. 2nd 718, 720 (Ga. App. 
1989). In the Brown case the appellant claimed that he had 
called the Psychology Board secretary and ireceived incorrect 
information as to the rules concerning licensure in that state. 
A year and a half later, upon completion of his degree, his 
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application was denied because he did not meet the criteria set 
out in the Rules. Brown sued the Board for negligence in not 
providing him with timely and accurate responses to his questions 
concerning licensure. The Brown case is relevant to this case in 
several ways. First, the statutes in Brown closely resemble the 
statutes in the State of Utah.5 Second, the facts of the case 
address the issue of an applicants "right" to practice as a 
psychologist. The Brown case states as follows: 
The [State], in the exercise of its police power to 
protect public health and welfare, may regulate health 
and related trades and professions...an individual does 
not have a constitutional right to practice a health 
care profession since such a right is subordinate tc 
the states right to regulate such a profession. 
Id, at 720 (Citations omitted.) 
Neither Brown nor Fussell have the basic "right" to a license if 
they do not meet statutory requirements. The States right to 
regulate the profession in order to protect the public and to set 
a predictable standard for all applicants supersedes other 
matters. 
5
 "Under OCGA section 43-39-5(b) the Board is expressly 
authorized to "adopt such rules and regulations as it may deem 
necessary for the performance of it's duties and [to] provide for 
examinations and pass upon the qualifications of the applicants 
for the practice of psychology. Under OCGA section 43-39-8(b)2, 
one of the requirements of a candidate for a license is that he or 
she "[h]as received a doctoral degree from a program in 
psychology. . . from an accredited educational institution recognised 
by the Board as maintaining satisfactory standards." Id. 
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The Brown case further states that 
"[T]he fact that Dr. Brown has worked as a psychologist for 
the state does not give him a vested right to sit for the 
licensing examination. Indeed, the state may require 
additional requirements which would prohibit those already 
licensed from continuing to practice in the regulated 
field.•• 
Id. at 720. 
Brown cites Hughes v. State Bd. of Med. Examiners 134 S.E. 
42 (Ga. 1926) in stating that "an individual takes his license 
subject to the states right . . . to make further restrictions 
and requirements, which will be upheld if reasonable, even though 
they prohibit some people from further engaging in a profession 
under a previously granted license." Jjd. at 721. 
POINT IV 
THE AGENCY'S ACTIONS ARE NEITHER ARBITRARY 
NOR CAPRICIOUS 
Fussell relies on Pro-Benefit Staffing in claiming that the 
agency has misapplied the law and that their actions are not 
supported by the intermediate standard of reasonableness and 
rationality. In doing so, Fussell ignores certain portions of 
Pro-Benefit. As stated above, the intermediate standard of 
review also governs the courts review of the Board's 
interpretation of the statutory law, particularly those that 
bespeak a legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to 
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the responsible agency. In the case at hand, it is clear that it 
was the legislature's intent that the Division and the Board 
interpret the statutes and promulgate the rules• These rules 
were written with the express intent of clarifying the 
requirements for licensure as a psychologist in the state of 
Utah, These rules were promulgated for the purpose of providing 
defined, clear, requirements for an applicant- Dr. Fussell's 
program of studies has not met those requirements. 
Fussell goes on to say that it is arbitrary and capricious 
to judge a doctoral candidates degree by three 03: four general 
paragraphs in the introduction of a course catalog. (Br. at 26). 
It is clear, however, from the testimony of the State's witnesses 
that their decision was not merely based on three or four general 
paragraphs. Rather, the Boards decision was based on a trine 
consuming and complex process that involved review and input by 
all members of the Board. More than not meeting with one section 
of a Utah rule, Fussell's program does not meet with the 
standards set in Utah and 33 other states. Fussell has not 
trained to be a Psychologist. Instead she set out on her own 
course of studies that has trained her to be Human Development 
Counselor. Despite the claim that her course work was 
supervised, her program was not directed toward psychology. Any 
input by supervisors would be directed toward Human Development 
29 
Counseling, Fussell has testified that she didn't bother to 
research or take classes in which she had no interest. 
(Transcript p. 180) "Within the confines of the [Human 
Development Counseling] program, and in conjunction with my 
interests. I designed the program with the assistance of my 
advisors..." Id. 
Fussell further claims that she has produced acceptable 
transcripts in this matter. In doing so, Fussell ignores the 
fact that the transcripts were never reviewed in depth by the 
Board and that it is Fussell who claims the transcripts are 
acceptable. Drs. Malouf and Schenkenberg both testified c^hat 
they had not considered or reviewed Fussell's record in order to 
make a judgement. (Transcript p. 164). All three agency 
witnesses expressed concerns about the fact that Ms. Fussell's 
program did not focus on psychology. As stated by Dr. Malouf, 
"in order to be considered a psychologist, you have to graduate 
from a program that is designed to train psychologist." 
(Transcript p. 140).6 
6
 According to Dr. Malouf, "my concern is that Dr. Fussell's 
program does not account for the fact that this is a core body of 
knowledge with set areas that are commonly accepted, and instead 
chose a specific ar€>a or specific problem area to focus on, which 
is much the same way as a marriage and family counselor or drag and 
alcohol counselor. (Transcript p. 143)" 
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In backing her claim that the Board's ruling was arbitrary 
and capricious, Fussell cites Rule 153-25-8(4) (i) of the Rules. 
According to Fussell, her qualifications meet with this section 
of the Rule and should, thus, reach the other qualifications. 
However, it must be noted, that in unrefuted testimony, the point 
was made that the Board did not yet review this section of the 
Rule. The Board's denial of licensure was based on section (b) 
of the rule. Sections (c) through (i) were not closely reviewed. 
(Transcript p. 165). Therefore, there is no basis other than 
Fussell's opinion, upon which to claim she meets with the 
requirements of section (i). Additionally, the rule is to be 
reviewed as a whole and the applicant must meet all sections of 
the rule, not simply one or two of them. 
Finally, there is unrefuted testimony to the effect that 
Fussell, does not meet other unreviewed sections of the rule. 
According to Dr. Schenkenberg, Fussell does not qualify under 
section 4 (e) which states, that "the program must be an 
organized sequence of study planned by those responsible for the 
training program, to provide an integrated, educational 
experience appropriate to the professional practice of 
psychology. Nor does she qualify under section (g) which 
requires that the program "must have an identifiable body of 
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students who are matriculated in the program for a degree. 
(Transcript p. 150-151).7 
Fussell has not demonstrated that the Agency's actions were 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Instead she appears to be 
claiming that because she might qualify for one unreviewed 
section all other qualifications should be ignored. The Rules 
provide clear and acceptable standard by which students or 
applicants may judge their needs and qualifications. Simply 
because Fussell chosen to ignore that standard does not make the 
rules arbitrary and capricious. 
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with the Utah statutes, the Psychologist 
Licensing Board and the Division have promulgated rules which set 
a standard which places applicants on clear notice of the 
requirements for a psychologists license in the State of Utah. 
Despite the fact that Fussell had notice and the ability to 
select a program of studies that would qualify her to become a 
7
 Dr. Schenkenberg goes on to say that "there's no doubt that 
the Human Development Counseling program had a matriculated, 
identifiable body of students, but there was no body of students 
revolving around the "program1* of study that Dr. Fussell developed 
for her self. 
Looking at this section rigorously and thoroughly and received 
a tremendous amount of input from all those individuals who had 
something to say on this matter. We concluded that the program of 
studies simply did not match the rules and regulations." 
(Transcript p. 154). 
32 
psychologist, she chose a course of studies which did not* The 
rules meet the statutory requirements and reflect a studied and 
careful basis for licensure. These rules can not be ignored or 
set aside simply because one applicant has decided to take a 
program of studies and a series of courses that fit her 
interests. Rather than being arbitrary and capricious in denying 
Fussell's license, the Division would be arbitrary and capricious 
in granting her one. The agencies decision to reject Fussell's 
application should be upheld* 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^) 1 day of December, 1990. 
lelfl-ssi M. HVibbell/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for the Division 
of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ->/ — day of December 1990, I 
mailed via first class, postage pre-paid a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing to:: 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
C0HNEf RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Juanita J. Fussell 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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BEFORE. THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION 
OF JUANITA FUSSELL 
FOR LICENSURE AS A PSYCHOLOGIST 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER 
BY THE DIVISION: 
Pursuant to Section 58-1-17(4)(b), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation are 
hereby adopted by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of 
the State of Utah. 
Dated this c f ^ day of May, 1990 
/CL— 
David E. Robinson, Director 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a petition 
for review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of this Order. Any 
petition for judicial review shall comply with the requirements set forth in 
Section 63-46b-16. 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION : 
OF JUANITA FUSSELL : FINDINGS OF FACT, 
FOR LICENSURE AS A PSYCHOLOGIST : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH : AND RECOMMENDATION 
Appearances: 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini for the Applicant 
Melissa M. Hubbell for the Division of Occupational & Professional 
Licensing 
BY THE BOARD: 
Pursuant to Section 58-1-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, a 
hearing was conducted on April 10, 1990 in the above-entitled matter before J. 
Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Commerce and a 
Special Appeals Board consisting of Steven M. Ross, Maureen L. Cleary and 
Bonnie Posselli. Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. 
The Board, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation: 
FINDINGS OF FAC1 
T. On August 5, 1987, the applicant filed an application with the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for licensure as a 
psychologist in the State of Utah. By letter, dated August 19, 1987, the 
Psychology Examining Committee requested the applicant to provide further 
information with regard to her doctoral program. The applicant submitted a 
response to that request on August 26, 1987. 
2. By letter, dated September 22, 1987, the Division notified the 
applicant that her application was denied because her degree-granting program 
did not qualify under Section 58-25-2 and Rule 4(b) of the rules pertaining to 
the Psychologists Licensing Act. By letter, dated November 16, 1987, the 
Division notified the applicant that counsel had been sought from the Attorney 
General's Office regarding the applicant's degree-granting program and that 
the Board would reconsider the application after receiving such counsel. 
By letter, dated January 26, 1988, the Division notified the applicant that 
the application was denied on the basis of the above-referenced statute and 
rule. 
3. By letter, dated January 6, 1989, the applicant informed the 
Division that she had completed the examination process to be licensed as a 
psychologist in Tenessee and became so licensed on December 13, 1988. Based 
on that licensure, the applicant requested that the Psychology Examining 
Committee reassess her application for licensure in this state. 
4. By letter, dated January 31, 1989, the Division again denied the 
application, stating as follows: 
Utah's law was written to more clearly specify those 
programs that are and are not considered psychology 
programs. Although you have taken courses in the 
psychology department, your degree is not in 
psychology. 
The only reasonable course of facts that we can 
recommend is that you earn a doctorate in a psychology 
program. Since this is what Utah (and most other 
states) require, there is no alternative that will 
suffice. The Utah law on this is quite clear. We are 
sorry for any problems that this may have caused you. 
5. By letter, dated April 25, 1989, the applicant documented her 
April 21, 1989 appeal from the denial of her application and requested that 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director, Department of Commerce, convene a 
Special Appeals Board. By letter, dated May 2, 1989, Mr. Buhler advised the 
-o-
applicant that such a board would be called to consider the denial of the 
application for licensure. 
6. On September 27, 1989, an initial hearing was conducted before 
a Special Appeals Board consisting of Elizabeth B. Stewart, David B. Erickson 
and Becky Rock. Certain evidence was offered and received by that Board. 
Sparing detail, the Division moved to recuse one of those Board members, that 
motion was granted and the remaining Board members were also recused from any 
further participation. As set forth above, the April 10, 1990 hearing was 
conducted before Dr. Ross, Ms. Cleary and Ms. Posselli. 
7. On May 10, 1985, the applicant received a Doctor of Education 
(Ed.D) degree through the Human Development Counseling program of the George 
Peabody College for Teachers at Vanderbilt University. The 1976-77 course 
catalog for the just-stated College reflects that doctorate degrees of 
education were available in three programs within the College: Human 
Development Counseling, Psychology and Special Education. The catalog 
describes the Human Development Counseling program as follows: 
The primary goal of the human development counseling 
program is to train individuals at the M.S., Ed.S and 
Ed.D levels to intervene via the helping relationship 
as a means of enabling persons to become more fully 
functioning. . . . The Peabody program recognizes 
the professionally trained counselor as a human 
development teacher whose primary function is to help 
individuals enhance life adjustment and facilitate 
behavioral development such that they can cope more 
effectively with their environment . . . 
Settings in which graduates apply their counseling 
skills will vary. They will include school counseling 
and guidance, classroom teaching, correctional 
institutions, vocational rehabilitation centers, 
mental health centers, drug treatment centers, 
marriage and family counseling clinics, and community 
action agencies. 
- < * -
The course catalog further provides as follows: 
The curriculum of the program in human development 
counseling conforms to the Standards for the 
Preparation of Counselors and Other Personnel Service 
Specialists developed by the Association of Counselor 
Educators and Supervisors (ACES), and is intended to 
reflect the trend in professional training programs 
toward competency/performance-based instruction. 
The central program units are six curriculum areas. 
Each area has a prescribed list of courses which are 
representative of the area. Students elect courses 
based on individual needs and area rather than course 
requi rements. 
8. The 1976-77 course catalog describes the Psychology program as 
follows: 
Programs in psychology reflect concern about the 
development of human resources and the discovery of 
new ways to bring psychological knowledge and research 
skills to bear upon societal problems, especially 
those which are amenable to intervention during the 
early years of life. A heavy emphasis is placed on 
doctoral level training in various specialty areas 
including developmental psychology, educational 
psychology, experimental psychology, mental 
retardation research, social and personality 
psychology, and transactional-ecological psychology 
(which includes subspecialties of clinical, community, 
counseling, and social psychology), which are 
accredited by the American Psychological Association . . . 
General requirements of all psychology students are 
kept to a minimal level to encourage students and 
their advisors to develop carefully thought-out 
programs designed to meet the specific needs of the 
individual students. A training committee of faculty 
and students exists for each area of specialization 
which sets specific guidelines and requirements for 
the specialization. 
9. The 1985 course catalog describes the Human Developement 
Program in the following terms: 
At the post-baccalaureate level the Department of 
Human Development Counseling (HDC) has as its primary 
goal the education of mental health generalists who 
will function in a host of mental health settings as 
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counselors. The program maintains a balance between 
didactic and experiential learning. The HDC program 
is interdisciplinary in nature with faculty and 
resources from such areas as psychology, sociology, 
management, education, human developement, and 
community organization. 
The catalog further provides as follows: 
The department has recently been singled out as one 
of 30 programs in the United States - out of nearly 
500 - to receive program and accreditation through the 
Counsel for Accreditation of Counseling And Related 
Educational Programs (CACREP), established by the 
American Association for Counseling And Development 
(formerly American Personnel and Guidance Association). 
The catalog also provides: 
Credentialing as a nationally certified counselor is 
possible through the department. In addition, 
certification as a school counselor may be obtained 
through appropriate course work. Students wishing to 
be licensed in marriage and family counseling or other 
related areas may arrange through additional course 
work and supervision to apply for licensure, depending 
on state regulations. Individuals interested in 
clinical psychology training or licensure as a 
psychologist, however, should apply to programs 
approved by the American Psychological Association. 
10. The 1985 catalog describes the Psychology program as follows: 
The Department of Psychology and Human Development 
offers programs of study leading to the professional 
degrees of M.Ed, and Ed.S in human development and the 
M.Ed, and Ed.S. in psychology. The department also 
offers course work toward the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees 
administered by the Graduate School . . . 
Degree programs in the department emphasize basic 
research as well as empirical, data-oriented approachs 
to practical problems in education and human 
development. The department is particularly concerned 
about the development of human resources and the 
discovery of new ways to bring psychological knowledge 
and research skills to bear upon societal problems, 
especially those amenable to intervention during the 
early years of life. Areas of specialization include 
the child development specialist program, 
-b-
developmental psychology, educational psychology, 
general psychology, mental retardation research, 
social/personality and social development, and a 
combined scientific/professional program in clinical, 
counseling, and school psychology with a community 
psychology component option. 
Specific guidelines and requirments beyond general 
departmental regulations are set by training 
committees of faculty and students in each area of 
speciali zation. 
11. A majority (58%) of the courses which the applicant completed 
to attain her doctorate degree were taught by faculty in the Psychology 
Department at Vanderbilt University and would have been generally available 
to students working toward a psychology degree. Approximately 80-90% of 
courses taken by the applicant toward completion of her doctorate degree were 
cross-listed to courses in the Psychology Department, although some of the 
just-referenced courses would not have been taught by faculty in the 
Psychology Department and would not have been generally available to students 
seeking a psychology degree. Three psychologists supervised the preparation 
of the applicant's doctoral dissertion. 
12. Subsequent to obtaining her doctoral degree, the applicant 
completed a psychology internship at the University of Utah and is presently 
employed as a counseling psychologist at the Weber State College counselling 
center. The applicant is supervised by a licensed psychologist and the 
nature of her existing employment is allowed, notwithstanding the fact that 
she is not licensed in this state. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The applicant asserts that she has received a degree based on a 
program of studies whose content was primarily psychological and contends 
that she has thus satisfied the requirements which were previously set forth 
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in Section 58-24-2(1)(b), quoted below. The applicant contends that the 
jjst-referenced statute, which was subsequently amended in 1989, did not 
require a doctoral degree in psychology when the application now under review 
was filed in 1987. The applicant asserts that Rl53-25-8(4)(b), also quoted 
below, is invalid if applied to mandate any such requirement. Thus, the 
applicant urges that her specific program of studies, while not culminating 
in a doctoral degree in psychology, was such that the consideration of her 
application for licensure should proceed in all remaining respects. 
Section 58-25-2(1) previously provided as follows: 
Each applicant for a license to practice as a 
psychologist shal 1: 
(b) produce transcripts of credit 
which are acceptable to the 
representative committee which 
demonstrate that the candidate for 
licensing has received a doctoral 
degree based on a program of studies 
whose content was primarily 
psychological from an accredited 
educational institution recognized by 
the division . . . . 
With respect to the just-quoted statute, R153-25-8 provides: 
4. " . . . a program of studies whose content is 
primarily psychological . . ." means: 
(b) the program wherever it may be 
administratively housed, must be 
clearly identified and labeled as a 
psychology program. Such a program 
must specify in pertinent institutional 
catalogs and brochures its intent to 
educate and train professional 
psychologists. 
In Athay v. Dept. of Business Regulation, Utah, 626 P.2d 965 (1981), 
an applicant for licensure as a psychologist, whose application had been 
denied on the basis that her curriculum had not been "primarily psychological" 
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in content, challenged the predecessor statute to Section 58-25-2(1)(b) as 
being unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous in the absence of any rules 
relating to the type of courses which would satisfy the statutory 
requirement. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that 
"the failure to establish guidelines for a curriculum or a criteria for 
course content . . . constituted arbitrary action and deprived plaintiff of 
her rights of due process of law". Id. at 968. Specifically, the Court 
quoted the following language from the trial court's decision: 
No rules, regulations, guidelines, or description of 
any kind relating to the type of courses which would 
be considered by the Committee to be "primarily 
psychological" within the meaning of the statute had, 
at that time, ever been adopted, published or 
communicated by the Committee or any of the defendants 
to the plaintiff, applicants in general, the public, 
or the University of Utah, although it appears that 
such definitions have been recently promulgated. 
Thus, no objective, identifiable standard existed 
against which the plaintiffs qualifications could be 
judged by her or anyone else, including the 
defendants." Id. at 966. (Emphasis in original.) 
The Court further quoted from the trial court's decision, as follows: 
The very circumstance that this Court is now being 
asked by defendants to determine as a matter of fact 
that plaintiff's curriculum was not primarily 
psychological in content illustrates the vague and 
ambiguous nature of the statute when applied in the 
absence of uniform, published, identifiable and 
objective standards. Plaintiff is here being deprived 
of an opportunity to qualify for examination as a 
licensed practitioner in her chosen occupation, and 
thus to earn her living, on the basis of standards 
which were not known and could not have been known by 
her or by the University and the Department which 
awarded her a Ph.D. in a field of specialization 
designated as "Educational Psychology". This result 
offends basic notions of due process. Id. 
R153-25-8(4)(a) through (i) reflects the various factors to be 
considered as to whether an applicant for licensure as a psychologist has 
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completed "a program of studies whose content is primarily psychological". 
Subsections (a) through (h) reference the nature of the program through which 
the applicant has obtained their degree, whereas subsection (i) sets forth 
the curriculum to be completed. For purposes of this proceeding, the only 
issue is whether the applicant has satisfied the provisions of Section 
58-25-2(1)(b), with specific reference to Rl53-25-4(b). 
The just-stated statute does not require that an applicant for 
licensure as a psychologist have a psychology degree. The rule in question 
also mandates no such requirement. However, the statutory language "based on 
a program of studies whose content was primarily psychological" evidences a 
legislative intent that both the nature of the degree-granting program and 
the content of courses taken by an applicant be considered as to whether the 
applicant has satisfied the provisions of Section 58-25-2(1)(b). Further, 
the criteria set-forth in R153-25-4 provides the appropriate guidelines by 
which to assess the necessary compliance with the statute. 
Concededly, the applicant has completed a significant number of 
courses whose content was psychological. Nevertheless, a considered review 
of the 1976-77 and 1985 Peabody College course catalogs which were referenced 
during the hearing clearly reflects that the Human Development Counseling 
program was not primarily psychological in nature. Notwithstanding the 
affidavit of Dr. Julius Seeman to the effect that the Human Development 
Counseling program emphasized the role of service providers and that a number 
of students took their degree through that program to qualify for licensure 
as psychologists, no reference is made to the study of psychology - whether 
based on either a clinical or research emphasis - in the 1976-77 course 
catalog which sets forth the description of the Human Development Counseling 
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program. Furthermore, the 1985 catalog reflects that the study of psychology 
is only one of six areas combined to offer what is referred to as an 
"interdisciplinary program". Significantly, neither of those catalogs 
reflect that the Human Development Counseling program was intended to train 
and educate professional psychologists. Thus, the applicant has not 
completed a "program" of studies "whose content was primarily psychological", 
as was required by Section 58-25-(l)(b) and as further defined in 
R153-25-4(b). 
RECOMMENDATION 
WHEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the application of Juanita Fussell 
for licensure as a psychologist in the State of Utah be denied. 
